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I. INTRODUCTION
On August 8, 2008, millions of people were sitting in front of their TV 
waiting for the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games.  Instead of a 
peaceful opening ceremony, the news started with a very different
headline: “War in the Caucasus!”1 
What had happened? Following a series of minor skirmishes between
South Ossetian militias and Georgian troops in July 2008, President 
Mikheil Saakashvili decided to “pacify” the region once and for all. 
Hence, he sent three brigades into South Ossetia, the country’s
breakaway region.2  This in turn triggered the intervention of Russia,
which claimed, inter alia, to have acted in defense of its citizens—90% 
of South Ossetians were given Russian passports in the last decade—and
its peacekeepers stationed there.3 
The Caucasus conflict of August 2008 illustrates “how international 
law has become one of the arenas in which contemporary wars are
fought.4  Both Georgia and Russia claimed the mantle of legitimacy in 
an effort to shape international perceptions of the conflict.”5  But which
party to the conflict really acted in accordance with international law?
1. See Michel Chossudovsky, War in the Caucasus: Towards a Broader Russia-
US Military Confrontation?, GLOBALRESEARCH.CA (Aug. 10, 2008), http://www.global 
research.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=9788. 
2. See infra notes 7–10 and accompanying text. 
3. See id.
4. Most international observers were quick to condemn Russia’s ‘illegal intervention’.
Sympathy thus quickly sided with little ‘David’ (Georgia), fighting the evil imperialist
giant ‘Goliath’ (Russia).
5. Anthony Dworkin, The Georgia Conflict and International Law, CRIMES OF
WAR PROJECT (Aug. 26, 2008), http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-georgia.html. 
148
HOFMEISTER (DO NOT DELETE) 12/9/2010 2:34 PM    
  
















    
   
[VOL. 12:  147, 2010] “Don’t Mess with Moscow”
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
In order to answer this complex question, this paper will proceed as 
follows: 
In Part II, it will first reconstruct the course of events that led to the 
outbreak of war. Having done so, it will then analyze in Part III the 
legality of Georgia’s military action, paying particular attention to the 
legal status of South Ossetia—is it a state, a de facto regime or still part
of Georgia proper?  In Part IV, it will proceed to examine Russia’s 
military intervention from a jus ad bellum perspective.  Finally, in Part
V, the author’s conclusions are summarized. 
II. A BRIEF CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
Reconstructing the course of events that led to the outbreak of the 
2008 Caucasus War is highly important—both from a legal and political 
perspective. Hence, on September 6, 2008 the European Union (E.U.), 
acting in its role as mediator, decided to set up a committee to
investigate the course of events. Yet, one year later its report still has 
not been published.  This is hardly surprising, given the difficulties in
ascertaining what had actually happened—contradictory accounts of 
events by the conflicting parties, and lack of access to certain parts of the
country as well as to witnesses all render the committee’s task a 
Sisyphean one.6  The following section will nevertheless attempt to 
reconstruct at least the basic contours of what happened. 
Since April 2008, the number of skirmishes between Georgians and
South Ossetians has increased dramatically.  Hence, Georgia decided to 
deploy three brigades close to South Ossetia.  The objective of this 
measure was twofold: to prevent South Ossetian attacks against Central 
Georgia and—should the opportunity arise—“to restore constitutional 
order” in this breakaway region.7 
Following an escalation of violence on August 7, 2008, Georgian
troops launched an artillery assault on villages close to Tskhinvali, from 
where South Ossetian militias had attacked the Georgian enclave of 
6. See Alice Bota, Russland darf alles, DIE ZEIT (Aug. 06, 2009), http://www. 
zeit.de/2009/33/01-Georgien.
7. See Georgia Decided to Restore Constitutional Order in South Ossetia. MoD
Official, CIVIL.GE: DAILY NEWS ONLINE (Aug. 08, 2008), http://www.civil.ge/eng/article. 
php?id=18941. 
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Tamarasheni.8  At 7:00 p.m., President Saakashvili announced a three 
hour cease-fire and offered both South Ossetia and Russia negotiations 
without any preconditions.  Despite significant communication problems, 
the Georgian minister responsible for South Ossetia and the Russian
special envoy, Jurij Popov agreed to meet the next day to discuss a 
solution to the conflict.  However, this meeting never took place.  After 
the ceasefire had expired at 10:00 p.m., President Saakashvili ordered a
large scale attack on Tskhinvali, the South Ossetian capital.9 Assaults by 
Georgian ground and air forces followed.10  The Georgian Government 
justified the attack in the following terms: 
Over the last several hours, separatist rebels in South Ossetia have undertaken a 
series of military attacks against unarmed civilians and peacekeeping forces in
several villages near Tskhinvali. . . . To protect peaceful civilian populations
and to prevent further military attacks, the Government of Georgia has been
forced to take adequate measures.11 
Moscow’s “military response began the next day, with the declared 
purpose of protecting Russian peacekeepers stationed in South Ossetia
and residents who had become Russian citizens in recent years. 
Beginning on August 8, Russian ground forces from the 58th Army
crossed into South Ossetia and Russian artillery and aircraft hit targets in 
South Ossetia and undisputed Georgian territory.”12  Faced with Russia’s
overwhelming military might, Georgia ordered its troops “to withdraw 
from South Osssetia on August 10 and two days later Russian forces 
moved into and occupied undisputed Georgian territory south of the 
administrative border with South Ossetia, including the city of Gori.  In
a separate operation from the west, moving through the breakaway
region of Abkhazia, Russian forces also occupied the strategically
important city of Poti in western Georgia.”13 
Both Georgia and Russia claimed “the mantle of legitimacy in an 
effort to shape international perceptions of the conflict.”14  But which 
party to the conflict really acted in accordance with international law?
8. See Day-by-Day: Georgia-Russia Crisis, BBC ONLINE (Aug. 21, 2008), http:// 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7551576.stm. 
9. See id.
 10. Jenny Norton, The Ossetian Crisis: Who Started It?, BBC ONLINE (Aug. 19,
2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7571096.stm. 
11. Statement of the Government of Georgia Regarding the Situation in the South
Ossetia Region of Georgia, EMBASSY OF GEOR. TO THE U.S. & CAN. (Aug. 8, 2008),
http://usa.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=142&info_id3941. 
12. Up in Flames, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 5 (Jan. 23, 2009), http://www.hrw. 
org/en/reports/2009/01/22/flames-0. 
13. Id.
 14. Dworkin, supra note 5, at 1. 
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In order to answer this complex question, this paper will first analyze the 
legality of Georgia’s military action.  Having done so, it will then examine 
Russia’s military intervention from a jus ad bellum perspective. 
III. THE LEGALITY OF GEORGIA’S ACTION
A. The Prohibition on the Use of Force 
1. Historical Background
Until the beginning of the twentieth century, the use of military force 
by states was regarded as an essential and appropriate instrument of 
international politics. In The Elements of International Law, American
jurist Henry Wheaton provided the legal basis for this view: 
[S]tates acknowledge no common arbiter or judge, except such as are constituted by
special compact.  The law by which they are governed, or profess to be governed, is
deficient in those positive sanctions which are annexed to the municipal code of
each distinct society.  Every State has therefore a right to resort to force, as the 
only means of redress for injuries inflicted upon it by others, in the same 
manner as individuals would be entitled to that remedy were they not subject to
the laws of civil society.  Each state is also entitled to judge for itself, what are the
nature and extent of the injuries which will justify such a means of redress.15 
The first steps designed to curtail the right of a sovereign state to resort
to war were taken at the beginning of the 20th century.16 The
unprecedented destruction and human suffering during the First World 
War prompted states to establish the League of Nations.17  Although the
Covenant of the League of Nations, signed in 1919, imposed some 
limitations upon the resort to war, it was not until the General Treaty for 
the Renunciation of War (Kellogg-Briand Pact) in 1928 that a 
comprehensive prohibition of war as an instrument of national policy
was achieved.  According to Article 1 of this Treaty, the contracting
parties “condemned recourse to war for the solution of international 
controversies and renounced it as an instrument of national policy in 
15. HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 290 (George Grafton 
Wilson, ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press 1936) (1866). 
16. See, e.g., Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes,
Oct. 18, 1907, 1 Bevans 577; Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes, July 19,1899, 1 Bevans 230. 
17. See MATHIAS HERDEGEN, VÖLKERRECHT 226 (2005). 
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their relations with one another.”18  However, like the League Covenant,
the Kellogg-Briand Pact19 lacked an enforcement mechanism and therefore
had little practical effect.  Guaranteeing such practical effectiveness was the
aim of the next attempt to limit the resort to force, the United Nations 
(U.N.) Charter, whose provisions will be discussed in the next section. 
2. Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter 
The U.N. Charter imposed an almost absolute prohibition on the use 
of force. Article 2(4) of the Charter provides that “all member states
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or 
in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations”20 
Several aspects of this prohibition require closer examination in the case 
under consideration. First, the military attacks by Georgian troops
against South Ossetian towns—in particular the bombing of Tskhinvali21 
—constitute a use of force within the meaning of Article 2(4).  Georgia 
is also a U.N. member state. 
Moreover, Article 2(4) requires the use of force by Georgia against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of another state. This 
requirement raises complex questions with regard to South Ossetia.  In 
particular, its legal status seems unclear.  Is South Ossetia a state, a
stabilized de facto regime, or still part of Georgia (proper)? 
Until the outbreak of hostilities, South Ossetia was regarded as an 
integral part of Georgia by the international community of states, 
including Russia. Georgia’s territorial sovereignty over South Ossetia
was thus generally recognized by the international community.  Hence,
Georgia’s military action against South Ossetian villages seems to
constitute an internal affair. International law, including Article 2(4), 
would not be applicable at all.  Rather, the measures referred to would 
have to be seen and evaluated in the light of national constitutional law.
However, things are a bit more complex.  South Ossetia might also be 
regarded as a stabilized de facto regime. As such, it would enjoy at least
 18. YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 83 (2005). The 
League Covenant (1919) did not abolish the right of states to resort to force altogether. 
War was still lawful, if the procedural safeguards laid down in Articles 10 to 16 of the
Covenant were observed. See id. at 80–82. 
19. The Kellogg-Briand Pact provided the legal basis for various bilateral and 
multilateral non-aggression pacts, for example the non-aggression pact between Germany
and the Soviet Union. See  WILLIAM KEYLOR, THE TWENTIETH CENTURY WORLD–AN 
INTERNATIONAL HISTORY 120–23 (2001).
20. U.N. Charter Art.2, para. 4.
21. On August 7–8, 2008. 
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partial international personality.  De facto regimes are territorial entities 
which control a more or less clearly defined territory without being 
recognized as a state.22 
They are regarded as “stabilized” if they exercise effective and permanent 
sovereignty over their territory—they must be de facto independent from 
their “paternal” state which is only left with formal territorial sovereignty.23 
Hence, de facto regimes fulfill the three constituent criteria for statehood: 
(1) a defined territory, (2) a people, and (3) an effective government.24 
What they lack, however, is international recognition as a state.25 
Prima facie, South Ossetia fulfills all the criteria outlined above, and 
therefore qualifies as a stabilized de facto regime: (1) it has a population; 
(2) a defined territory over which it exercises effective and permanent
control; and (3) it has a state-like structure, based on a constitution, a 
parliament, a president, a cabinet, local authorities, courts, and has its
own armed forces. Since 1992, it has held elections on a regular basis.26 
Moreover, South Ossetia has also concluded international treaties with
Russia and Georgia, for instance the peace agreement of 1992.27 
Yet, qualifying South Ossetia as a stabilized de facto regime is
problematic for two reasons.  First, its government does not exercise 
effective control over the whole territory of South Ossetia.  And second, 
South Ossetia is fundamentally dependent on Russia, and hence not truly 
sovereign. I will deal with both aspects in turn. 
Before hostilities broke out in August 2008, the South Ossetian 
government only exercised effective control over some 60–70% of the 
former autonomous region.  The rest of the territory was still under the 
control of the Georgian government.  Yet, from a legal perspective, it is 
not necessary to establish effective control over 100% of a formally
 22. Jochen Frowein, De facto regime, in 1 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 966–68, (Peter MacAlister-Smith ed., 1992). 
23. See TORSTEN STEIN & CHRISTIAN V. BUTTLAR, VÖLKERRECHT 166 (2009).
24. See, e.g., JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2006).
25. See STEIN & BUTTLAR, supra note 23. 
26. See, e.g., Referendum über Südossetiens Unabhängigkeit von Georgien  NEUE 
ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG, Nov. 13, 2006, at 3 (Switz.). 
27. It has also repeatedly declared itself independent based on the results of popular
referenda. See, e.g., South Ossetia Votes for Independence, BBC ONLINE (Nov. 13, 2006),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6140448.stm. 
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defined territory.  It is sufficient to have exclusive control of a larger, not 
completely insignificant territory.28 
Secondly, does it matter that South Ossetia is fundamentally dependent 
on Russia, and hence not really sovereign?  Admittedly, South Ossetia’s
geographic position makes it highly dependent on Russian supplies, 
particularly through its main lifeline—the Roki Tunnel.  In addition,
Russians have held many key positions in the South Ossetian government.
For instance, the Prime Minister, the Defense Secretary, and the Home
Secretary were all Russian by birth. Yet, does this affect qualifying 
South Ossetia as a de facto regime?  The answer to this question must be 
in the negative. Qualifying an entity as a de facto regime does not
require evidence of its sovereignty.29 History shows that without the
support of a strong background state, a de facto regime cannot become
stabilized and permanent.30 
In conclusion, it can therefore be argued that South Ossetia constitutes 
a stabilized de facto regime.  As such, it is granted partial international 
personality. But what does this mean for the case under consideration? 
In particular, does the prohibition of the use of force also apply to de 
facto regimes? 
State practice shows that “the prohibition of the use of force applies
irrespective of recognition to all independent de facto regimes.”31  The 
Friendly Relations Declaration of 1970 explicitly states: 
Every State likewise has the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force to 
violate international lines of demarcation, such as armistice lines, established by
or pursuant to an international agreement to which it is a party or which it is
otherwise bound to respect.32 
This includes the borders of so called “de facto regimes. Article 1 of the 
Definition of Aggression—adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly in Resolution 3314—contains an explanatory note according
to which the term State”33 is employed “without prejudice to questions
of recognition or to whether a State is a member of the United 
Nations.”34  In other words, it also applies to de facto regimes.  Support
28. See Frowein, supra note 22. 
29. See MATHIAS HERDEGEN, VÖLKERRECHT  101 (2005). 
30. See id.
 31. Frowein, supra note 22. 
32. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. 
A/8028, at 122 (Oct. 24, 1970). 
33. See Frowein, supra note 22. 
34. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. 
A/PV.2319, at 143 (Dec. 14, 1974). 
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for this view can also be found in the practice of states.35  For instance, 
during the Vietnam War many governments argued that non-recognition 
of a certain part of a “divided country could not affect the applicability
of Article 2(4) [U.N.] Charter in that respect.”36 In short, de facto 
regimes enjoy the protection offered by Article 2(4).  At the same time
however, they are obliged under Article 2(4) not to use force against 
another state.37 
Thus, when bombing South Ossetian villages, Georgia used force in 
violation of Article 2(4).  This use of force is prohibited under international
law, unless a specific charter provision, such as Articles 39–42 or 51, 
says otherwise. 
B. Exceptions to the Prohibition on the Use of Force
There are basically two exceptions38 in the U.N. Charter to the 
prohibition on the use of force contained in Article 2(4).39  First, states
may use force when so authorized by the U.N. Security Council pursuant
to its powers under Chapter VII of the Charter.  Second, and perhaps 
even more important in the given context, states may use force in self-
defense. Both exceptions will be addressed in turn. 
1. Authorization by the Security Council 
The U.N. Charter’s procedure for authorizing the use of force is
relatively straightforward.  According to Article 39 of the U.N. Charter,
the Security Council must first “determine the existence of any threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”40 Once the Council 
has made such a determination, it may “make recommendations or 
35. See Frowein, supra note 22. 
36. Id.
37. See also HERDEGEN, supra note 29. 
38. There is also a third exception which is of hardly any importance today: Action 
against former “enemy states” of World War II. See U.N. Charter art. 53, para 1.  See 
also id. art. 107. 
39. And customary rules. For details on the customary law prohibition on the use
of force, in particular its character as a rule of jus cogens, see DINSTEIN, supra note 18, at
99–112. 
40. U.N. Charter art. 39. 
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decide what others measures shall be taken to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.”41 
Pursuant to Article 41 of the U.N. Charter, the Council should first 
consider calling on member states to apply “measures not involving the 
use of armed force. . . . These may include complete or partial interruption 
of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and 
other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic
relations.”42 However, should these non-military measures prove
inadequate, the Security Council may then “take such action by air, sea 
or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international 
peace and security”43 pursuant to Article 42—the Council may then
authorize the use of military force. 
However, in the given case, no U.N. Security Council authorization
was granted. Hence, Georgia can only invoke the second exception to 
the prohibition on the use of force—self-defense.
2. Self-defense 
The second exception to the prohibition on the use of force is self-
defense.  Article 51 of the U.N. Charter44 sets forth the standard requiring: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by the Members in 
the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility
of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action
as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and
security.45 
a. Armed Attack 
For the use of force in self-defense to be legitimate, an armed attack 
against a member state of the U.N. must occur.  The term “armed
attack,” however, is neither defined in the U.N. Charter, nor does any
detailed discussion of the term appear in the records of the San Francisco
41. See id.
42. U.N. Charter art. 41. 
43. U.N. Charter art. 42. 
44. It must be emphasized that Article 51 also applies to de facto regimes. If de
facto regimes enjoy the protection offered by the prohibition on the use of force, they
must also accept the concomitant obligations, i.e., not to use force themselves and to 
refrain from committing armed attacks.
45. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
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Conference.46  Hence, the meaning of this phrase has generated a vast 
literature with little consensus on its definition.47  The test eventually 
accepted by states was that adopted by the General Assembly in 
Resolution 3314,48 taken by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in
the Nicaragua case as applicable to the concept of armed attack.49  In  
that case, the ICJ argued that an armed attack includes: 
‘[A]ction by regular armed forces’50 or ‘the sending by or on behalf of a State of 
armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed
force against another state of such gravity as to amount to acts of aggression.’51 
Did the South Ossetian attacks against Georgia amount to an armed
attack within the meaning of Article 51? The shelling of the Georgian 
enclave of Tamarasheni by South Ossetian forces on August 7, 2008 
may constitute such an armed attack.  However, in the Nicaragua case,52 
and later in the Oil Platforms case,53 the ICJ also emphasized a further 
element—gravity. Not every frontier incident amounts to an armed
attack. Only action of certain gravity—actions of certain scale and 
effects qualify as an armed attack.  I will deal with both criteria in turn. 
The shelling of Tamarasheni alone was arguably not of a sufficient 
scale to amount to an armed attack.  The bombing of this village was 
limited both in time and space, there were no aircraft or heavy artillery 
involved in the attack, and the death toll was also low.  One could argue 
though, that the action, when considered in the context of prior South
Ossetian attacks, may amount to a single “ongoing armed attack” —so-
called “accumulation of events theory.”54  This theory has been advanced 
both by the United States in the Oil Platforms case55 and by Israel to
46. See Mark B. Baker, Terrorism and the Inherent Right of Self-Defense, 10
HOUS. J. INT’L L. 25, 33 (1987). 
47. See CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 114–25 (3d
ed. 2008). 
48. See G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 34. 
49. See GRAY, supra note 47, at 172. 
50. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.)
1986 I.C.J. 14, 103, ¶ 195 (June 27). 
51. “[Or] [other] substantial involvement therein.” Id. The I.C.J. later clarified that
the gravity criterion is also applicable in traditional inter-state conflicts. See generally
Oil Platforms Case (Iran v. US), 2003 I.C.J. 161 (Nov. 6). 
52. See Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 14. 
53. See Iran v. U.S., 2003 I.C.J. 161. 
54. See, e.g., Norman Feder, Reading the UN Charter Connotatively: Toward a
New Definition of Armed Attack, 19 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 395 (1987). 
55. See Iran v. U.S., 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶¶ 51, 62. 
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justify military strikes against the Palestinian Liberation Organization
(PLO) in Lebanon.56  Both countries argued that a deliberate strategy of
inflicting a series of small scale attacks on another state amounted— 
when considered cumulatively—to one grave ongoing armed attack.57 
However, this theory is not convincing. When accepting the fiction that 
a number of small attacks amount to one ongoing grave attack, it would 
be impossible to determine whether the ensuing response constitutes 
lawful self-defense or an unlawful reprisal.  The Security Council therefore
rightly rejected this theory.58  Hence, Georgia would be ill-advised to
invoke the accumulation of events theory to argue that the attack was of 
a sufficient scale.
Turning now to the effects of the attack, it will be equally difficult for 
Georgia to argue that the attack on Tamarasheni had significant effects.
Some scholars interpret the term “effects” as meaning the loss of
political independence.59  However, this seems to be going too far.  Yet, 
even when applying a lower threshold, it seems difficult to find evidence 
for such effects.  The effects of the South Ossetian attacks were only of a
limited nature.  They led to the destruction of a number of buildings in 
villages inhabited mainly by ethnic Georgians.  The death toll was also
low. 
In summary, it seems very difficult to argue that the South Ossetian 
attacks were of such a scale and effect as to amount to an armed attack
within the meaning of Article 51. 
b. Proportionality 
Even assuming argendo that an armed attack had occurred, the
Georgian response would not have been proportional.
This requirement is derived from customary international law,60 in 
particular the Caroline case of 1837.61  According to this case, for self-
56. See GRAY, supra note 47, at 125. 
57. See id.
58. See, e.g., S.C. Res 490, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/490 (July 21,1981). See also,
S.C. Res. 501, ¶ 1–2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/501 (Feb. 25,1982); S.C. Res. 509, ¶ 1, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/509 (June 6,1982); Oil Platforms Case (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 
161, 33 (Nov. 6) (separate opinion of Judge Simma, para. 14). Judge Simma also
rejected the “accumulation of events” theory in his separate opinion in the Oil Platforms 
case: “[T]here is in international law on the use of force no ‘qualitative jump’ from 
iterative activities remaining below the threshold of Article 51 of the Charter to the type
of ‘armed attack’ envisaged there.”
59. See, e.g., Kirsten Schmalenbach, Die Beurteilung von grenzüberschreitenden 
Militäreinsätzen gegen den internationalen Terrorismus aus völkerrechtlicher Sicht, 42 
NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WEHRRECHT 177, 180 (2000) (Ger.). 
60. Its origins date back to just war theory.
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defense to be legitimate, it has to be established that the armed forces 
“did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act justified by the
necessity of self-defense must be limited by that necessity and kept 
clearly within it.”62  In other words, the proportionality requirement 
means that the amount of force used must be proportional in terms of 
intensity.  The intervening state must plan and carry out the military
action carefully so as not to inflict more damage and deaths than necessary.
The large scale shelling of the South Ossetian capital Tskhinvali63 by
Georgian armed forces, which left many parts of the city destroyed, was
clearly disproportionate. The scale of the attacks was indicative of the
fact that the Georgian government intended not only to repel the attacks 
of South Ossetia but also to restore full sovereignty over the whole 
territory of South Ossetia and to teach the rebels a lesson.64  Such far-
reaching measures are not covered by Article 51. 
The Georgian government, therefore, cannot invoke Article 51 to 
justify its intervention in South Ossetia.  Even when assuming that South 
Ossetia had committed an armed attack, which is more than questionable, 
Georgia’s response would have been clearly disproportionate. 
IV. THE LEGALITY OF RUSSIA’S ACTION
A. The Prohibition on the Use of Force 
1. Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter 
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter imposes an almost absolute 
prohibition on the use of force.  It provides that “all member states shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or 
in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”65
 61. LETTER FROM DANIEL WEBSTER, U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE, TO HENRY FOX,
BRITISH MINISTER IN WASHINGTON (Apr. 27, 1841), reprinted in 29 BRITISH & FOREIGN 
STATES PAPERS 1840-1841, 1129, 1137–38 (London, James Ridgway and Sons, Piccadilly
1857).
62. Id. at 1138. 
63. On August 7–8, 2008. 
64. See Georgien marschiert in Südossetien ein, NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG, Aug. 8,
2008, at 2 (Switz.). 
65. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
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Several aspects of this prohibition require closer examination in the 
given context.
First, Article 2(4) prohibits the use of force66 “in any manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”67  The use of 
force to prevent large-scale human rights violations—“humanitarian
intervention”—has been claimed as legitimate on the ground that it is 
not only consistent with the principles of the U.N. Charter, but also 
furthers them.68 
Russia claimed that the purpose of its intervention was the prevention 
of genocide.69 In other words, it invoked a right to unilateral humanitarian
intervention—a right to intervene for humanitarian purposes, here the
prevention of genocide, without the authorization of the Security
Council. This claim raises a number of questions: (1) First, does a right 
to unilateral humanitarian intervention exist at all?  And if so, (2) are its 
conditions met in the case under consideration?  I will deal with both 
questions in turn.
a. Does a Right to Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention Exist? 
The existence of a right to unilateral humanitarian intervention is one 
of the most controversial issues in international law. Supporters of such 
a right point to a number of potential precedents, including India’s
intervention in East Pakistan, Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia, 
Tanzania’s invasion of Idi Amin’s Uganda, and the joint U.S.–British70 
operation in Northern Iraq to protect Kurdish civilians.  A closer analysis 
of these incidents however, reveals that none of the intervening states— 
except for the United Kingdom (U.K.) in 1991—“advanced an argument 
of humanitarian intervention.  Even then, the U.K. quickly abandoned its
claim in favor of arguing that it had the implied authorization of the U.N.
Security Council.  Overall, this near absence of opinio juris deprived the 
66. The military attacks by Russian armed forces against Georgian cities and villages—
in particular the bombing and ensuing invasion of Gor—undoubtedly constitute a use of 
force within the meaning of Article 2(4).  See id.
 67. U.N. Charter, supra note 65. 
68. See, e.g., Michael Reisman, Humanitarian intervention to protect the Ibos, 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 167, 177 (Richard Lillich ed., 
1973).
69. See, e.g., Statements of Russian President Medwedew and Prime Minister
Putin, quoted in Georgien ruft den Waffenstillstand aus: Abchasien mischt sich in den 
Konflikt ein, NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG, Aug. 11, 2008, at 2 (Switz.). 
70. See MICHAEL BYERS, WAR LAW 92 (London: Atlantic, 2005) (showing Britain, 
France, Italy and the United States intervention in Northern Iraq).
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state practice of any capacity to change international law to allow a right 
of unilateral humanitarian intervention.”71 
The Kosovo conflict is often regarded as “having changed this calculus in
favor of a new rule.”72  This argument is not convincing though.  Despite
much talk about the humanitarian dimension of the Kosovo conflict, in
the end only two states—the U.K. and Belgium—justified the air strikes 
on the basis of a legal right to humanitarian intervention.73  There was 
thus a notable absence of opinio juris.  In addition, China, Russia, and 
most developing countries strongly condemned the intervention. Their 
continuing opposition means that the doctrine is far from firmly established
in international law.74 
In conclusion, the better approach is to deny, at least as yet, the
existence of a unilateral right to humanitarian intervention.  This view 
appears to be confirmed by post-Kosovo state practice, in particular, the
reaction of the international community towards the crisis in Darfur.75 
b. Would the Criteria for Humanitarian Intervention be 
Met in the Given Case?
Even assuming argendo, that a unilateral right to humanitarian
intervention exists, this would be of little use to Russia for the following 
reason: the conditions for its exercise would not be met in the case under 
consideration. Despite some uncertainty regarding the exact conditions
for the exercise of this right, most scholars76 agree that the use of armed 




74. See also DINSTEIN, supra note 18, at 71. 
75. This trend also seems to be confirmed by the UN Secretary General’s 2005
Report ‘In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all’ as
well as the 2005 World Summit Outcome document. Both documents leave open the 
question as to whether there is a right of unilateral humanitarian intervention absent any 
Security Council authorization. See CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE
OF FORCE 52 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
76. At least those who support this doctrine.  See, e.g., STEIN & BUTTLAR, supra
note 23, at 293. 
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human rights, and (2) only as a last resort.77  In the case under consideration 
both criteria are not met.
The human rights violations by Georgia—while undoubtedly serious 
—did not amount to an extreme deprivation of fundamental rights.  In 
comparison with Cambodia, where Pol Pot killed approximately 25% of 
the Cambodian population,78 and Uganda, where Idi Amin’s regime had
killed an estimated 500,000 people, the atrocities committed in South
Ossetia pale—according to Russian officials, 133 South Ossetians79 were 
killed during the conflict.80  These figures hardly support Moscow’s claim 
that a humanitarian intervention was necessary to stop an ongoing 
genocide. Moreover, force should have been employed as ultima ratio— 
after all peaceful means have been exhausted.  Yet, Russia did not even
attempt to seek a U.N. Security Council meeting in order to solve the 
situation.81 
c. Summary
Russia cannot invoke a right to unilateral humanitarian intervention to 
justify its attack for a number of reasons. First, the doctrine itself is not
firmly established in international law.  Second, even assuming argendo
that a humanitarian emergency constitutes a lawful ground for the use of 
force, this would still be of little help to Russia for a simple reason: the
conditions for the exercise of this right would not be met in the case 
under consideration.82  Russia thus used force in violation of Article 
77. Further conditions include: The state targeted by the intervention must be
unwilling or unable to act and the intervention must be limited in time and scope. See
Resolution on the Right of Humanitarian Intervention, 1994 O.J. (C 128) 225, 227 (EC). 
78. See Pol Pot: Life of a Tyrant, BBC NEWS (Apr. 14, 2000), http://news.bbc.co. 
uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/78988.stm. 
79. As well as sixty-four Russian soldiers. 
80. See Christos Pourgourides, The Consequences of the War Between Georgia
and Russia, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Committee on Legal 
Affairs and Human Rights, Doc. 11732 rev. (Oct. 8, 2008), available at http://assembly.
coe.int/documents/workingdocs/doc08/EDOC11732.htm. 
81. The Security Council meeting on the evening of 7 August 2008 cannot be taken
into consideration here as the military conflict had already started. See Press Release, 
Security Council, Security Council Hears Conflicting Russian, Georgian Views of Worsening 
Crisis as Members Seek End to Violence in Day’s Second Meeting on
South Ossetia, U.N. Press Release SC/9418 (Aug.8, 2008), http://www.un.org/news/press
/docs/2008/sc9418.doc.htm. 
82. On a final note, it seems quite ironic that Russia which used to deny the
existence of such a right (particularly during the Kosovo conflict) now all of a sudden
became one of its strongest supporters. Yet, a state which persistenly objected to the
formation of a new rule, cannot all of a sudden invoke this new rule now that it suits its 
own interests. 
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2(4).83  This use of force is prohibited under international law, unless a 
specific Charter provision, such as Articles 39–42 or 51, says otherwise. 
B. Exceptions to the Prohibition on the Use of Force 
There are basically two exceptions84 to the prohibition on the use of
force85: authorization by the Security Council and self-defense.  In the
absence of any Security Council authorization, Russia could only invoke 
self-defense. The Russian government has therefore claimed that it 
intervened in defense of (1) its peacekeepers stationed in South Ossetia,86 
(2) its citizens living in South Ossetia,87 and (3) in collective self-defense of
South Ossetia. All three arguments will be examined in the next section. 
1. Self-defense (Peacekeeping Forces) 
According to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, “nothing in the present
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security.”88 
a. Armed Attack 
For the use of force in self-defense to be legitimate,  an armed attack
against a member state of the U.N. must occur.  The term “armed
attack,” however, is neither defined in the U.N. Charter, nor does any
detailed discussion of the term appear in the records of the San Francisco
Conference.89  Hence the meaning of this phrase has generated a vast 
83. And its customary law equivalent. 
84. There is also a third exception which is of hardly any importance today: Action 
against former ‘enemy states’ of World War II. See U.N. Charter arts. 53, 107.
85. For details on the customary law prohibition on the use of force, in particular
its character as a rule of jus cogens, see DINSTEIN, supra note 18, at 91–104. 
86. “Last night, Georgian troops committed what amounts to an act of aggression
against Russian peacekeepers and the civilian population in South Ossetia . . . Georgia’s 
acts have caused loss of life, including among Russian peacekeepers.” Dmitry Medvedev, 
President of Russ., Statement on the Situation in South Ossetia (Aug. 08, 2008), http://
president.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/08/08/1553_type82912type82913_205032.shtml. 
87. See id.
88. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
89. See Baker, supra note 46, at 41–42. 
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literature with little consensus on its definition.90  The test eventually 
accepted by states was that adopted by the General Assembly in 
Resolution 3314,91 taken by the ICJ in the Nicaragua Case as applicable
to the concept of armed attack.92  In that case, the ICJ argued that an
armed attack comprises:
‘[A]ction by regular armed forces across an international border’93 or ‘the sending 
by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries,
which carry out acts of armed force against another state of such gravity as to
amount to acts of aggression.’94 
Georgian troops did not cross the border into Russia nor did Georgia 
send any armed bands into Russia.  Prima facie, no armed attack thus 
seems to have occurred.  Yet on either August 7 or 8, Georgian forces 
attacked Russian peacekeepers stationed in South Ossetia under the 1992
Peace Agreement, and killed more than a dozen of them during the 
ambush.95  Such an attack on the armed forces of another state—even 
when they are deployed outside their national territory—constitutes an
armed attack for the purposes of Article 51.96  This view finds support in
Article 3(d) of the Definition of Aggression which is widely relied on 
when interpreting Article 51.  Article 3(d) provides that “an attack by the
armed forces of a state on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air 
fleets of another State” qualifies as an act of aggression.97  Although the
concept of aggression is broader than the term armed attack, “reliance on 
the Definition of Aggression to elucidate the meaning of armed attack
seems justified in the light of state practice.”98  The Georgian assault on 
Russian peacekeepers therefore amounted to an armed attack within the 
meaning of Article 51. 
90. See GRAY, supra note 47, at 108–20. 
91. See G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 34. 
92. See GRAY, supra note 47, at 165. 
93. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14, 103, ¶ 195 (June 27). 
94. “[O]r [other] substantial involvement therein.” Id. at 103. The I.C.J. later 
clarified that the gravity criterion is also applicable in traditional inter-state conflicts. See
Iran v. U.S., 2003 I.C.J. 161, at 146–47. 
95. See Day-by-Day: Georgia Russia Crisis, BBC NEWS, (Aug. 21, 2008), http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7551576.stm. 
96. See DINSTEIN, supra note 18, at 200. 
97. See G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 34, at art. 3(d). 
98. See GRAY, supra note 47, 130. 
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b. Proportionality 
It is, however, questionable whether the Russian response was
proportional.  This requirement is derived from customary international 
law, in particular the Caroline case of 1837.99  According to this case, for 
self-defense to be legitimate, it has to be established that the armed
forces “did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act justified by
the necessity of self-defense must be limited by that necessity and kept
clearly within it.”100 
The proportionality requirement comprises two main conditions.  First,
the amount of force used must be proportional in terms of intensity. The
intervening state must plan and carry out the military action carefully so
as not to inflict more damage and deaths than necessary.  Second, the
duration of the military strike must be limited to the elimination of the 
threat. Self-defense must not serve as a pretext for territorial annexation
or regime change.  Russia’s response to the killing of its seventeen
peacekeepers was neither proportional in terms of intensity nor in terms
of duration. Following the attack on its peacekeepers, Russia launched a
large scale military intervention.  Russia sent more than 10,000 troops 
into South Ossetia and Georgia proper. Russian troops not only attacked
the Georgian town of Gori from where the strikes against the peacekeepers
were launched, but also parts of Georgia unrelated to the conflict, such
as the oil-port of Poti. The objective of Russia’s large scale military 
intervention was not to repel the Georgian attack and to restore the 
“status quo ante,” but to significantly weaken Georgia’s military capacity.
In summary, Russia’s claim to have acted in defense of its peacekeepers 
is not convincing.  While the Georgian attack on the peacekeeper’s 
headquarters in Tskhinvali constituted an armed attack within the 
meaning of Article 51, Russia’s response was clearly disproportional. 
99. For details on the Caroline case, see Webster, supra note 61. 
100. Id. at 1138. 
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2. Self-defense (Citizens Living in South Ossetia) 
Russia has also claimed to be acting in defense of its citizens living in 
South Ossetia. Whether this claim is more convincing from a legal 
perspective will be examined in the next section. 
a. Article 51 and the “Protection of Nationals    
Abroad” Doctrine 
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter sets forth the standard for the use of
force in self-defense. It provides: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by the Members in the exercise
of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council 
and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems 
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.101 
“Despite this careful attempt at definition, the content of Article 51 is 
greatly informed by customary international law, in part because of the 
explicit reference to the inherent character of the right of self-defense.
And so, while the right is codified in an almost universally ratified
treaty, its contours have gradually evolved—or at least become more
easily discernible—as the result of state practice and expressions of 
opinio juris since 1945.”102  For instance, it was not evident from the
ordinary meaning103 of Article 51 whether an attack against a state’s
citizens outside its territory constitutes an armed attack against the 
state.104  Precisely, this problem does arise in the case under consideration: 
Does the Georgian attack on Russian citizens living in South Ossetia
constitute an armed attack against Russia? 
i. The Protection of Nationals Abroad Doctrine—Legal Evidence 
It can be argued that an attack on the state’s nationals abroad is an 
attack on the state itself—”Protection of Nationals Abroad Doctrine.”
This argument would rest on the premise that the nationals would be the 
101. U.N. Charter Art. 51. 
102. 
103. 
BYERS, supra note 70, at 56. 
Or the context. 
104. See BYERS, supra note 70, at 56–57. 
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“state” for the purpose of the actual or threatened armed attack.  This
interpretation finds support in the theory of the social contract: 
“[P]rotection, as the duty of the state, afforded the consideration of the
pactum subjectionis, and the protection of the nationals of the state was,
in effect, protection of the state itself. Within the definition of the state
the requirement of a community is essential, and without nationals,
without the community, the state ceases to exist.”105  It thus seems  
“perfectly possible to treat an attack on a state’s nationals as an attack on
the state, since population is an essential ingredient of the state.”106 
This interpretation seems to find support in state practice, in particular 
the Entebbe incident of 1976.  On June 27, 1976, an Air France aircraft 
bound for Paris from Tel Aviv was hijacked by pro-Palestinian terrorists.  
The aircraft, with mainly Israeli passengers on board, was then diverted
to Entebbe airport in Uganda.  The Ugandan Government under Idi 
Amin proved uncooperative and did not attempt to rescue the hostages. 
Hence, Israel decided to free the hostages itself.  “Without notifying the
Ugandan government, a small force landed at Entebbe airport, stormed
the plane,”107 and eliminated the terrorists.  Several Ugandan soldiers
were also killed during the operation.  Before the U.N. Security Council, 
the Israeli ambassador claimed that the operation was an application of 
“the right of a state to take military action to protect its nationals.”108 
The United States explicitly supported Israel’s action, arguing:
[T]here is a well established right to use limited force for the protection of one’s
own nationals from an imminent threat of injury or death in a situation where
the state in whose territory they are located is either unwilling or unable to
protect them.  This right, flowing from the right of self-defense, is limited to
such use of force as is necessary and appropriate to protect threatened nationals
from injury.109
 105. DEREK W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 91 (1958).
106. Derek W. Bowett, The Use of Force for the Protection of Nationals Abroad, 
THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 39, 40–41 (A. Cassese ed. 1986). 
See also Seventh International Conference of American States Held at Montevideo,
Convention on Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933 (listing as the essential 
criteria for statehood: (1) a permanent population. . .). 
107. BYERS, supra note 70, at 57. 
108. U.N. SCOR, 31st Sess., 1939th mtg. at 13, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1941 (July 9, 
1976).
109. U.N. SCOR, 31st Sess., 1941st mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1941 (July 12, 
1976). 
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The Entebbe operation is widely regarded as having decisively contributed
to the recognition of a right to protect nationals abroad.110  When civil 
war threatens foreign nationals, “sending soldiers to rescue them has
now become so commonplace that the issue of legality is rarely raised.”111 
The interventions in Haiti, Liberia, and Sierra Leone are case in point.112 
Recent state practice thus seems to offer a “significant quantity of
cases of military interventions aimed at rescuing foreigners abroad.”113 
According to Gazzini, most of “these interventions have gone entirely
unchallenged.”114 When controversy does occasionally arise, for instance 
when France intervened in the Chad in 1992115 or the Central African 
Republic in 1996, “concerns usually focus on whether the intervening
government has exceeded the criteria of necessity and proportionality— 
for example, by using the protection of nationals as a pretence for 
intervening in a civil war.”116  The fundamental theory thus appears to be
no longer disputed, only its application to the given facts.  Some scholars,
therefore, conclude that “after decades of opposition by the majority of
the international community, the claim seems to have eventually
overcome any resistance.”117 
However, this conclusion is not convincing for a number of reasons. 
First, none of the incidents were addressed by the Security Council or
the General Assembly, “or otherwise sparked an exchange of legal
claims, implying that it is difficult to distill relevant opinio juris. 
Second, several of the cases listed concern operations that were actually 
approved by the territorial state, and which can therefore not be regarded
as genuine examples of protection of nationals.  In other cases, it
remains unclear whether consent was given or not.  Third, most of the 
precedents cited actually pre-date the U.N. General Assembly debate on
diplomatic protection, during which many states denounced the 
protection of nationals doctrine, so that it is hard to regard these cases as
the dominant trend in customary practice”.118
 110. BYERS, supra note 70, at 58. 
111. Id.
112. For details of these interventions, see  STEIN &. BUTTLAR, supra note 23, at 
289–94. 
113. TARCISIO GAZZINI, THE CHANGING RULES ON THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 170 (2006).
114. Id.
115. Or in Gabon (1990). 
116. BYERS, supra note 70, at 58. 
117. GAZZINI, supra note 113, at 171–72. 
118. Tom Ruys, The Protection of Nationals Doctrine Revisited 28 (Leuven Centre 
for Global Governance, Working Paper No. 17, 2008). 
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In conclusion, state practice is not as unambiguous as claimed by
advocates of the Protection of Nationals Abroad Doctrine.  The better 
view seems to be that state practice has not yet contributed to a limited 
extension of the right of self-defense to include the protection of 
nationals abroad. 
ii. The Protection of Nationals Abroad Doctrine—The Criteria
Assuming argendo, that Article 51 could be interpreted in such a way
as to include a right to protect nationals abroad, this would still be of
little help to Russia for the following reason: the conditions customary 
practice has identified for such intervention to be lawful were not met in
the case under consideration. These conditions include: 
(a) the protecting state has failed to secure the safety of its
nationals by peaceful means; 
(b) the injuring state is unwilling or unable to secure the safety of 
the nationals of the protecting state; 
(c) the nationals of the protecting state are exposed to immediate
danger to their persons; 
(d) the use of force is proportionate in the circumstances of the 
situation;
(e) the use of force is terminated, and the protecting state withdraws
its forces, as soon as the nationals are rescued.119 
While criteria (a) to (c) seem to be fulfilled in the case under consideration, 
Russia’s military intervention was clearly not proportionate.  Following
the attack on “its citizens,”120 Russia launched a large scale military 
intervention—it sent more than 10,000 troops into South Ossetia and 
Georgia proper. Russian troops not only attacked the Georgian town of 
Gori from where the strikes against “its citizens” were launched, but also 
parts of Georgia unrelated to the conflict, such as the oil-port of Poti. 
Moreover, Russia did not withdraw its forces as soon as its nationals
 119. Special Rapporteur, First Rep. on Diplomatic Protection, Int’l Law Comm’n,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/506 (Mar. 03, 2000) (By John Dougard). See, e.g., U.N. Int’l L. 
Comm’n., Meeting, 52d Sess., 2617th mtg. at 36, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2000 (May
09, 2000). Criteria (a) to (c) can be regarded as subcategories of the ‘necessity’ criterion,
whereas criteria (d) to (e) can be regarded as subcategories of the ‘proportionality’ criterion. 
120. Or rather on its ‘newly created’ citizens. 
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were rescued. Its troops remained in Georgia until October 2008.  Hence, 
condition (e) was not met either. 
Last, but not least, Russia’s attempt at justifying its military action in 
Georgia as “defense of its nationals” is also questionable for another 
reason: the “mass naturalization” of South Ossetians which preceded
Russia’s intervention—was incompatible with principles of international
law, in particular the non-intervention principle.121  Invoking such an 
illegally effected situation to justify measures that further consolidate 
this illegal state of affairs constitutes an abuse of the law—”nullus 
commodum capere potest de sua propria iniuria.”122 
b. Summary 
Russia cannot invoke the protection of nationals abroad doctrine in 
order to justify its intervention for a number of reasons. First, the 
concept itself is not clearly established in international law.  Indeed, the 
better view seems to be that state practice has not yet contributed to a 
limited extension of the right of self-defense to include the protection of
nationals abroad. 
Second, even assuming argendo that the protection of nationals 
abroad is a lawful ground for the use of force, this would still be of little 
help to Russia for the following reason: the conditions customary
practice has identified would not be met in the case under consideration 
because Russia’s military attack was clearly disproportionate. 
Finally, Russia’s attempt at justifying its military action in Georgia as 
“defense of its nationals” is also questionable for another reason: the 
“mass naturalization” of South Ossetians—which preceded Russia’s
intervention—was incompatible with principles of international law.
Invoking such an illegally effected situation to justify measures that 
further consolidate this state of affairs constitutes an abuse of the law. 
3. Collective Self-defense
Last, Russia argued that its intervention was justified on the basis of 
“collective self-defense.”  Collective self-defense is explicitly sanctioned 
by Article 51, which provides that “[n]othing in the present Charter shall
121. See, e.g., THEODOR SCHWEISFURTH, Völkerrecht 299 (2006). 
122. ‘No one may derive an advantage from his own unlawful acts’ (Translation by
author). See also Case Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia
(Ger. v. Pol.), 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.1 at 30 (May 25), http://www.worldcourts.com/ 
pcij/eng/decisions/1926.02.05_silesia/. 
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impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an 
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations . . . .”123 
The right to collective self-defense is a jus accessum—it is contingent 
on the existence of a South Ossetian right to defend itself.  But did South 
Ossetia have such a right? Prima facie, this appears problematic because
Article 51 only applies to “Members of the United Nations,” a status
South Ossetia has not yet been granted.  However, as outlined above,124 
South Ossetia is a stabilized de facto regime.  As such, it enjoys the 
protection of Article 2(4): States may not use force against a de facto
regime.125  However, if states are not allowed to use force against a de
facto regime, then it would be inconsequential to deny a de facto regime 
the right to use of force in self-defense should it actually become the 
target of an armed attack.  Thus, Article 51 also applies to de facto
regimes.
Having established that Article 51 is applicable in the given case, I 
will now turn to the specific criteria for collective self-defense.  In the 
Nicaragua case, the ICJ put forward a two-fold test regarding the 
exercise of collective self-defense:126 the State under attack must (1) have
declared itself to be under attack and (2) must request the assistance of
the third state.127 In the case under consideration, both criteria are met:
South Ossetia declared itself under attack by Georgia.  Moreover, Russia 
123. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
124. See supra Part III.A.2. 
125. And the de facto regime may not use force against other states. 
126. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14, 104, ¶ 195 (June 27). (“[I]t is also clear that it is the State which is 
the victim of the armed attack which must form and declare the view that it has been so
attacked. There is no rule in customary international law permitting another state to 
exercise the right of collective self-defence on the basis of its own assessment of the 
situation.   Where collective self-defence is invoked, it is to be expected that the state for 
whose benefit this right is used will have declared itself to be the victim of an armed 
attack.”) (emphasis added).  The Court then went on to argue that “there is no rule 
permitting the exercise of collective self-defence in the absence of a request by the State 
which regards itself as the victim of an armed attack.” Id. at ¶ 199. 
127. This approach was questioned by Judges Schwebel and Jennings in their 
dissenting opinions. Both criticized the Court’s formalistic approach: For instance, Judge 
Schwebel asked: “Where is it written that a victim state may not informally and quietly
seek foreign assistance?” Id. at 356, ¶ 191 (dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel). Judge
Jennings argued: “[I]t may be doubted whether it is helpful to suggest that the attacked 
state must in some more or less formal way have ‘declared’ itself the victim of an attack 
and then have as an additional requirement made a formal request to a particular third
state for assistance.” Id. at 544. 
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only intervened after South Ossetia’s parliament had requested its support 
on August 8, 2008.
Finally, any action taken in collective self-defense must also be
proportional.  As outlined above however, Russia’s large-scale military 
intervention in Georgia fails to meet this requirement.  As a result, it can
be argued that Russia cannot invoke the right to collective self-defense 
to justify its military attack. 
V. CONCLUSION
The Caucasus conflict of August 2008 illustrates “how international 
law has become one of the arenas in which contemporary wars are
fought.  Both sides claimed the mantle of legitimacy in an effort to shape
international perceptions of the conflict.”128  By and large, Russia failed
to convince the international community of the lawfulness of its 
intervention.  Moscow’s arguments have rightly been rejected as this
article has shown. 
For instance, the Protection of Nationals Abroad Doctrine—which 
Russia invoked—is not clearly established in international law.  Indeed, 
the better view seems to be that state practice has not yet contributed to a
limited extension of the right of self-defense to include the protection of
nationals abroad. 
Moreover, Russia’s claim to have acted in defense of its peacekeepers 
is not convincing either. While the Georgian attack on the peacekeeper’s
headquarters in Tskhinvali constituted an armed attack within the 
meaning of Article 51, Russia’s response was clearly disproportional and 
hence, unlawful.
Finally, Russia’s claim that its intervention was justified on the basis 
of collective self-defense is not persuasive either.  Any action taken in 
collective self-defense must also be proportional.  As outlined above, 
however, Russia’s large scale military intervention in Georgia clearly
fails to meet this requirement. 
Small Georgia, fighting the evil giant Russia, managed to escape
closer legal scrutiny. This article has however, tried to show that Georgia’s
military intervention in South Ossetia also constitutes a violation of 
international law.  South Ossetia is a so-called “stabilized de facto regime” 
and as such enjoys the protection of Article 2(4).  Georgia cannot justify
its intervention as self-defense within the meaning of Article 51, because 
of its disproportional use of force. 
128. See Dworkin, supra note 5.
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In short, both Georgia and Russia have violated norms of international 
law, despite the fact that their constitutions accord rules of international
law the highest status within their legal hierarchy.129  So is international
law the biggest loser in this conflict?  Prima facie, it may seem so.  On
closer examination, however, it turns out that this is not necessarily the 
case.  Both parties claimed that their action was justified under international 
law, for instance as a humanitarian intervention to prevent genocide or 
as collective self-defense under Article 51.  “This is not to say that these 
claims were made in good faith—some Russian claims in particular
seemed wildly exaggerated and cynical—but the fact that they were
made at all shows some recognition that compliance with international 
rules”130 is regarded as important and helps determine a country’s global
standing.
129. See KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art.
15(4) (Russ.); SAKARTVELOS K’ONSTITUTSIA [CONSTITUTION] Aug. 24, 1995, art. 6 (Geor.). 
130. Dworkin, supra note 5.
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